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Abstract 
Descendant Clock Auctions have been increasingly used in power markets. Traditional approaches are focused on discovering the bidders’ 
best response but neglecting the bidders’ adaptation. This paper presents an algorithm based on decision theory to estimate the bidders’ 
behavior throughout the auction. The proposed model uses portfolio concepts and historical data of spot markets to estimate a long-term 
contract supply curve. This model was applied to evaluate the Colombia’s Organized Market (MOR). Demand curve parameters and round 
size were varied to evaluate their impact over auction outputs. Results show that the demand curve has a quite small impact over bidders’ 
decisions and round size management is useful to avoid non-competitive bidders’ behavior. In addition, it is shown that auction’s starting 
prices strongly influence auction’s clearing prices. These results are extremely helpful to design market structures in power markets. 
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Modelado de subastas dinámicas para compra de contratos 




Las subastas de reloj descendente han incrementado su uso en los mercados de energía eléctrica. Las aproximaciones tradicionales a estas 
subastas se han enfocado en encontrar la mejor respuesta de los postores pero desconociendo la adaptación de ellos a lo largo de la subasta. 
Este artículo presenta un algoritmo basado en la teoría de decisión para estimar el comportamiento de los postores a lo largo de la subasta. 
El modelo propuesto usa conceptos de portafolios financieros y datos históricos sobre el mercado spot de energía eléctrica para estimar 
una curva de oferta de contrato de los generadores. El modelo fue utilizado para evaluar el Mercado Organizado (MOR) en Colombia. Los 
parámetros de la curva de demanda y el tamaño de la cada ronda, fueron variados para evaluar el impacto sobre la salida de la subasta. Los 
resultados muestran que la curva de demanda tiene un pequeña impacto sobre la adaptación de los pujadores y que el tamaño de ronda es 
útil para evitar los comportamientos no competitivos. Adicionalmente se muestra que los precios de inicio de la subasta tienen una gran 
influencia sobre los precios de cierre. Los resultados aquí presentados son útiles para el diseño de estructuras de mercado en el sector 
eléctrico. 
 





1.  The problem 
 
Auctions are an important allocation mechanism, and 
they have been employed to trade many goods for a long 
time. Nowadays, auctions are employed in many fields as one 
of the most important allocation mechanisms. This has 
increased the researchers’ interest about enlarging auction’s 
understanding. In fact, auction modeling has been deeply 
explored in many areas of economics and engineering. 
The first approach to auction modeling comes from 
economic theory, using mathematical models to determine 
equilibrium strategies for different types of auctions [1]. 
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These models are useful to understand bidders’ behavior and 
some auction’s features; however, mathematical models have 
limitations because strong assumptions are necessary to 
obtain a model’s equilibrium. 
Nowadays, computational models allow some of the 
mathematical model’s limitations to be overcome. There are 
many examples of computational agent-based models useful 
for auction design, comparison and performance evaluation. 
About design auction, in [4] an auction mechanism is 
settled by using an agent-based model. In [5] an agent-based 
model is proposed not only for an auction but for a fully 
automated negotiation system. 
About evaluation of auctions’ performance, many works 
have been carried out based on agent-based models. Several 
features have been studied, for example Shanshan Wang 
worked on the advantages of combinatorial auctions [6], Kim 
on the effect of auction repetition [7], Akkaya on the format 
of online auctions [8] and Sow on risk-prone evaluation by 
using agent-based models [9]. 
Moreover, these computational models have been 
employed to compare different auction formats. In [10] 
discriminatory and uniform price auctions are compared by 
using an experimental analysis based on a multi-agents 
model, and in [11] a similar comparison is done using 
learning agents. 
In power markets, auctions are commonly used since 
deregulation became a trend. In the Colombian case, there is 
an electricity market composed of two mechanisms: bilateral 
financial contracts and a spot market, which is a uniform 
price auction. A sealed bid auction, like a uniform price 
auction, is the most common auction format in electricity 
markets and has been widely modeled even with agent-based 
learning in the Colombian case [2,3,12]. 
Espinoza compared different formats of sealed bid 
auctions by determining an equilibrium strategy for each 
format using econometric models [13]. Moreover, Gallego 
determined the bidders strategies by exploring the historical 
data about Colombian wholesale market and employed a 
learning algorithm. [14]. 
Recently, a new kind of auction has been included in 
electricity markets: multi-round (dynamic) auctions. These 
kinds of auctions show a distinctive feature when compared 
to traditional auctions: bidders adjust their bids throughout 
the auction so the analytic solution problem is harder to solve 
than sealed bid auctions. Nevertheless, it is possible to find 
examples of modeling dynamic auctions using computational 
techniques, as is shown in [15], where a multi-round English 
auction is modeled using genetic network programming. 
Furthermore, some spot electricity markets have used 
dynamic auctions, but the principal purpose of dynamic 
auctions is to trade Long Term Supply Contracts (LTSCs) 
[16,17]. In LTSCs auctions, it is especially important to avoid 
the so-called winner’s curse; this happens in common value 
auctions when the winner overpays because his estimate is 
higher than the other bidders’ average estimate. Thus, 
dynamic auctions are often used to trade LTSCs, given that 
they allow bidders to fit their bids along the auction and 
thereby they reduce possible overpayment [18]. 
Despite some LTSCs’ auctions using a static format, like 
Chilean [19] and Peruvian [20] electricity markets, most of 
LTSCs’ auctions are dynamic (New Jersey [21], Illinois [22] 
and New England [23]), Brazil [19], Spain [24] and 
Colombia [25]). 
In addition, LTSCs’ auctions differ from sealed bid 
auctions because the bidders’ decision making involves 
additional aspects such as financial risk (due to spot prices’ 
volatility) and generation uncertainty. Roubik [26] worked 
on generators’ strategic behavior in LTSCs auctions by using 
portfolio concepts. Four variables were proposed to be able 
to understand the generators’ behavior: 1) Mean spot price, 
2) Spot price variance, 3) Contract price and 4) Risk aversion 
[26]. Other contract procurement auction models are 
Moreno’s who studied two static auction formats by using 
Bayesian equilibrium concepts [27]; Azevedo’s who also 
used Bayesian equilibrium but to analyze bilateral contract 
auction carried out in Brazil in 2003 [28] and Garcia-
Gonzales’ who modeled the bidding strategy of a wind power 
producer in a Descending Clock Auction [29]. 
A Descending Clock Auction is a dynamic procurement 
auction that has been recently introduced in several power 
markets. In short, this auction works as follows. The 
auctioneer calls bids in successive rounds. Each round has a 
maximum and a minimum price. The round’s maximum price 
is equal to previous round’s minimum price. Hence, the bid 
price is always descending. In every round the auctioneer 
adds all bids and announces the total aggregate supply. 
Auction ends when aggregate supply is equal or less than 
total demand [30]. 
From an economic approach, Ausbel & Cramton [31] and 
Milgrom [32] are the main references. They used a Lyapunov 
Function to find an equilibrium strategy and their main 
conclusion is that sincere bidding by the bidders is an 
equilibrium of the auction game, and, starting from any price 
vector, the outcome converges to the competitive 
equilibrium. However, these models are based on strong 
assumptions about rationality, continuity, and others that 
allow the easing of the analytic solution. Moreover, Ausbel, 
Cramton and Milgrom say that the most important feature of 
a dynamic auction is that the winner’s curse is weakened, 
given that bidders can fit their bids along the auction [33]; 
however, the model used to demonstrate the equilibrium 
strategy is static and the adjustment is not evident. 
From an engineering approach, models about descending 
clock auctions are pretty scarce. In [34], Barroso established 
an optimization model for a price-taker hydrothermal 
GENCO to devise bidding strategies in multi-item dynamic 
auctions for long-term contracts. 
In order to fill the absence of auction’s models from an 
engineering perspective, this paper presents a methodology 
that models the bidder’s decision in every round in order to 
maximize their revenues. For this purpose, a MATLAB 
program based on decision theory [35] and microeconomic 
theory [36,37], was developed. This allows for the bidders 
behavior along the auction to be simulated. The bidders 
model uses portfolio concepts [26] and historical information 
about their preferences in the spot market. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II the 
proposed model is presented, first the bidder model and then 
the scenarios faced by the bidders in the auction and the 
possible rewards to a chosen strategy are presented. In 
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Section III the model is applied to the Colombian Energy 
Market. Section IV presents some results of model 
implementation. Finally, Section V summarizes the main 
conclusions. 
 
2.  Proposed model 
 
In this section, the proposed descending clock auction 
model is presented. This model fits an auction mechanism in 
the Colombian power market known as MOR, including two 
main parts: 
 The Bidders Model: This part focuses on representing 
the bidder’s valuations about the product to be 
auctioned: a long-term energy supply contract (LTSC). 
Since historic information about energy contracts is not 
available due to reasons of confidentiality, it was 
necessary to design a methodology to set the valuations 
from the spot market’s bids and financial portfolio 
concepts. 
 Decision Making: In this part the decision making is 
modeled based on a set of scenarios, a set of bidding 
strategies and a set of rewards. 
Below, both parts will be described. 
 
2.1.  Bidders model 
 
In a descending clock auction, the auctioneer asks bidders 
about their bids at every round price, i.e. bidders disclose the 
supply curve point by point. In fact, bidders’ behavior is 
based on this supply curve as a representation of their LTSC 
valuations. 
In order to calculate their LTSC’s valuations this paper 
proposes a methodology that consists of three stages: 1) 
Summarize the spot market information through an statistic 
supply curve 2) Estimate the GENCO’s risk aversion and 
finally 3) Calculate the LTSC’s valuation by using a utility 
function that includes expected generation (obtained from 
spot market information), risk aversion and variables about 
the commitment period of LTSCs (expected spot price, 
variance spot price). 
Moreover, the information about LTSC bids is not 
available, but the information about bids on the spot market 
is plentiful given that GENCOs offer a supply curve on a 
daily basis for this market. This curve is formed from 
individual generation plants’ bids that must be ordered by 
price in such a way that the accumulated quantity is 
determined by adding every unit’s offered quantity. 
Based on every GENCO’s daily bid, a statistical supply 
curve can be obtained by ordering every daily supply curve 
as follows: 
i. Steps in supply curves are represented by points in a 
scatter plot (Fig. 1). 
ii. Next, these points are clustered by price ranges. For 
each cluster a set of statistical measurements are 
calculated (i.e. mean, max, min, quartiles) with the aim 
of building different statistical supply curves. 
iii. Finally, clusters are combined in such a way that every 
cluster’s mean is greater than the previous one in order 
to ensure the supply curve’s monotonicity (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 1. Scatter Plot of Spot Market Bids.  




Figure 2. Statistic Supply Curve of Spot Market Bids.  
Source: The authors 
 
 
Now, the resulting expected values for each price can be 
understood as the expected supply curve or expected generation 
function (G(P)). It is important to note that G(P) represents the 
total generation (MW) allocated in both markets, spot and 
contracts rather than only the generation power allocated in the 
spot market. The amount to be sold in the spot market is 
calculated from subtracting GENCO’s contract obligations. 
Also, an optimal hedge level for a given contract price can 
be determined by using portfolio concepts, [26] as follows: 
i. First, it is necessary to represent hedge preferences by 
utility functions as are commonly used in portfolio 
evaluations. This utility function allows two objectives 
to be balanced: the expected earnings maximization and 
financial risk mitigation. In general terms, GENCO’s 
revenue is calculated using equation 1 where b is the 
contract price, G(b) is the expected generation at 
contract price b, h is the hedge level (contract sales), (1 
- h) is the spot market sales and ̅ is the mean spot price. 
 
, 1 ∗                    (1) 
 
ii. Now, the expected value for the GENCO‘s revenue and 
its involved risk (understood as the revenue variance) 
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can be balanced by using a Linear Mean-Variance 
Utility Function (LMVUF) having a risk aversion 
constant (γ) (equation 2) 
 
∗  
	 1 ̅ ∗ 	 1 	  (2) 
 
iii. From the LMVUF’s derivative with respect to h, the 
optimal hedge level can be found. This optimal hedge 
level depends on the estimated average spot price, its 
variance and the GENCO’s risk preferences (γ), as is 







iv. Next, it is possible to estimate a hedge curve by 
calculating the optimal hedge level for several prices 
using equation 3. 
Finally, a Contract Supply Curve (CSC) is calculated by 
multiplying G(P) and the obtained hedge curve as it was 
described in step 4. However, some assumptions were 
necessary to calculate this curve. First, the generators are able 
to make good estimations about average and variance of spot 
price, otherwise, it is a mistake to use the historical data to 
calculate γ. Second, risk aversion does not present 
meaningful changes between commitment periods. Last but 
not least, generators plan their risk hedge using a LMVFU to 
represent their risk preferences. 
Formally, the Contract Supply Curve is calculated as 
follows: 
i. By choosing a period of time and getting its spot market 
historical information. 
ii. By determining contract sales, spot sales and weighing 











iii. By calculating the spot price mean ( ̅ ), the spot price 
variance ( ) and assuming a contract price (b) (i.e. the 
average price of the contracts for the entire power market). 
iv. By calculating risk aversion by clearing (γ) from 






i. By predicting the mean ( ̅) and variance spot price ( ) 
for the commitment period of contract. 






, 0  (6)
 
 
Figure 3. Risk Aversion Effect on Contract Supply Curve.  
Source: The authors 
 
 
i. By determining the expected generation as a function of 
price (G(P)) for the commitment period of contract. 
ii. By calculating the Contract Supply Curve (CSC(P)) by 
multiplying point by point curves h(P) and G(P) 
 
   (7) 
 
One of the most important contributions of the proposed 
methodology is that once a Contract Supply Curve is 
estimated, it is also possible to estimate the effect of the risk 
aversion in the Contract Supply Curve. Fig. 3 shows the risk 
aversion effect on a contract supply curve. The three shown 
Contract Supply Curves were estimated with the following 
parameters: ̅=200 $/kWh, = 1000 and 
0.04, 0.1, 0.31 . This figure shows that the higher the risk 
aversion, the larger the amount of energy to be allocated in 
contracts for the same price. 
 
2.2.  Decision making: Scenarios, strategies and rewards 
 
Unlike sealed bid auctions, in a descending clock auction 
the allocations and payments not only depend on a single bid, 
but on bids sent in previous rounds; consequently, finding an 
equilibrium strategy using game theory is more difficult in 
this kind of auctions. Thus, decision-making was based on an 
alternative theoretical framework: decision theory. 
Decision theory is a set of criteria that allows someone to 
choose among different strategies under several feasible 
scenarios. When the scenarios’ probabilities are known, it is 
called decision under risk, and, consequently, decision-
making is based on the expected strategy revenue. The most 
common criterion in this kind of decision making is the 
expected value criterion. This criterion weights rewards by 
the scenario’s probability of finding the strategy’s expected 
value [35]. 
In every round in a descending clock auction, bidders face 
two scenarios:  
i. The next round in the auction will be the last one. 
ii. The next round in the auction will not be the last one. 
These two scenarios are enough to understand the 
decision making. On one hand, if bidders have certainty that 
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next round is not the last one, they will strategically bid to 
improve their position in the auction. On the other hand, if 
bidders have certainty that next round is the last one, they will 
bid in order to maximize their revenue. 
In fact, bidders can choose among many possible bids, but 
to limit the choices it is important to balance the results 
accurately and the time spent to get them. Therefore, it is 
proposed that the bidders’ choices can be grouped in three 
strategies as follows: 
i. Bidding a quantity of energy according their CSC 
curves. 
ii. Bidding a larger quantity of energy than the one set by 
their CSC curves. 
iii. Bidding a smaller quantity of energy than the one set by 
their CSC curves. 
Now, for each scenario-strategy there is an associated 
reward, i.e. for strategy i and scenario j the associated reward 
is Uij. When next round is the last one (Scenario 1), the 
reward (Ui1) is calculated from equation 2 with b equal to the 
round price (Pa), given that payment is actually achieved in 
the final round. 
In scenario 2 (the next round is not the last one), rewards are 
not real revenues given that there is no payment. However, 
bidders choose an optimal strategy to drive the auction toward a 
convenient point where they can maximize their revenues at the 
end of the auction. Therefore, the strategy’s reward is the 
expected revenue derived from the current strategy. 
In addition, if an auction has interdependent estimations, 
bidders may be motivated to send bids that differ from their 
real valuations. In other words, if each bidder’s estimate is 
partially based on rivals’ information, one bidder offering 
small quantities might induce his/her rivals to decrease their 
valuations and, consequently, they may leave the auction. 
Furthermore, bidders may also have incentives to hold their 
bids. A bidder inflates their valuations in the hopes of 
exhausting the competitors’ limited budgets. Then, a bidder 
shifts to bid its real valuation for these goods, now facing 
weakened competition [30]. The chosen strategy depends on 
the expected strategy’s impact on aggregate supply. This 
impact depends on bidder’s market power. 
Assuming that all bidders have historical information 
about other bidders, they can estimate the aggregate supply 
for each price based on the aggregate supply for the previous 
round price and the historical offers for the same price. Next, 
based on a supply curve estimate and a demand curve, the 
residual demand (DR) is calculated [36]. Once the bidder has 
the auction situation summarized in the residual demand, it is 
easy to estimate the expected revenues for a given strategy. 
In order to estimate the expected revenue for a given 
strategy, an algorithm was implemented in MATLAB. This 
algorithm follows these steps: 
i. Calculate the probability that the current aggregate 
supply curve be greater than the historical aggregate 
supply curve for the current round price. 
ii. Estimate other bidders’ aggregate supply (SO) for the 
next round price based on historical data and the 
probability found at step one. 
iii. For the three possible strategies (si), calculate the 
aggregate supply for next round price ASr+1|si by 
adding SO and si. 
Table 1. 
Bidder’s Decision Matrix in a Dynamic Auction 
 P = Pclear P ≠  Pclear 
S1=CSC(P) U11 U22 
S2=CSC(P) + ΔQ U21 U22 
S3=CSC(P) - ΔQ U31 U32 
Source: The authors 
 
 
iv. Calculate the probability that ASr+1|si be greater than 
the historical aggregate supply for next round price. 
v. Estimate other bidders’ aggregate supply for the future 
price rounds (SOf (Pf)). SOf (Pf) based on two limits: 
(SOf (Pf)max) and (SOf (Pf)min). 
 SOf (Pf)max is other bidders’ maximum aggregate 
offer at a future round price (Pf ). For every Pf value, 
SOf (Pf)max it is such that the probability of SOf 
(Pf)max is greater or equal to other bidders’ historical  
aggregate supply, which is equal to Prb. 
 SOf (Pf)min is the other bidders’ minimum aggregate 
offer at a future round price (Pf), and is estimated by 
taking the other bidders’ minimum historical 
aggregate supply at price Pf. 
vi. Estimate maximum (DRmax) and minimum (DRmin) 
residual demand from SOf (Pf)min, SOf (Pf)max and 
the demand curve (DC(Pf)) as follows: 
 
 	   (8) 
 
	   (9) 
 
vii. Determine the set of possible clearing prices from 
DR(Pf)min, DR(Pf )max and the range of possible own 
bids. 
viii. Calculate the expected reward (Ui2) based on the 
obtained set of possible clearing prices. 
Based on expected rewards a decision matrix can be 
written (Table 1). Once this matrix is established, it is 
necessary to estimate the probability of each scenario in order 
to use the expected value criterion to choose the most 
convenient strategy under the feasible scenarios. 
The probability of scenario 1 (Probsc1) (next round being 
the last), is estimated based on the historical data about the 
clearing price. The probability of scenario 2 is calculated as 
(1-Probsc1). 
 
3.  Model application 
 
The proposed model was applied in the Colombian power 
market and specifically to a new market auction scheme 
proposed in the last 5 years. The following sections describes 
this application 
 
3.1.  Colombian electricity wholesale market 
 
The Colombian power market (known as MEM) was 
created in 1995 as a competitive environment for the 
generation and energy retail activities. This market structure 
assures the existence of enough sellers and buyers avoiding 
any direct influence of any agent over the final energy tariffs 
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[12]. In addition, MEM allows the trading of energy by 
means of a spot market or bilateral contracts, and both 
choices might be represented as an energy portfolio to 
manage the suppliers’ revenue risk. In this market, hiring 
100% of power generation lets suppliers know the expected 
annual revenues, implying lower levels of risk. Nevertheless, 
the average spot price is usually higher than the average 
contract price, so, hiring 0 % of power generation maximizes 
the expected revenue. Consequently, an optimal hedge level 
must be determined in order to maximize the revenue at an 
acceptable risk level. 
In addition, there are two kinds of final customers: 
regulated and non-regulated customers. The regulated 
customers pay a tariff that is fixed by the regulator. This tariff 
transfers the purchase energy cost that was paid by its 
incumbent retailer. On the other hand, non-regulated 
customers buy energy through a competitive scheme. 
 
3.2.  Organized market (MOR) 
 
Five years ago, a new scheme to trade energy for the 
regulated customers has been designed: the Organized 
Market (MOR). MOR is a descending clock auction where 
standard long term energy supply obligations are traded. In 
other words, the auction product is a standardized contract 
with a fixed commitment period (one year). According to this 
new market structure, suppliers/retailers who want/need to 
sell/buy energy to regulated customers must bid exclusively 
through this new market scheme (MOR). 
Retailers have a passive role in MOR, the auctioneer asks 
them for the energy needed and sets an aggregate demand 
curve by adding the retailers’ requests. Moreover, the 
auctioneer fix two prices: PP1 and PP2. PP1 is the maximum 
price that the auctioneer is willing to buy for the total energy 
demand while PP2 is the maximum price that the auctioneer 
is willing to buy only for any fraction of the demand. 
Before the auction takes place, the available information 
is limited. PP2 is known, PP1 is unknown, and a range of 
values for the possible total demand is given instead of an 
accurate total demand. Thereby, bidders do not know the real 
demand curve. Instead they have an expectation that can be 
represented by lower and upper limits. 
During an auction, the auctioneer sets a range of prices 
for which the bidders are able to offer. This range sets a 
variable called round size. For each round, the auctioneer sets 
the round size in order to balance the auction’s transaction 
costs and the available time to fit the bidders’ bids. 
Additionally, a suitable handling of this round size allows the 
chances of exercising market power to be limited. 
Finally, the auction ends when the aggregate supply 
meets the total demand curve. Then, the auctioneer discloses 
the final allocations. 
 
3.3.  Simulation parameters 
 
The proposed model was applied to MOR in order to evaluate 
the impact of varying its parameters: PP2, PP1 and round size. 
Six generators were modeled and their main features are 
presented in Table 2. These agents choose one of the 
following three strategies in every round: 
Table 2. 
Chosen Generators to Model MOR 
 Plants Risk Aversion 
GENCO A 5 0.04 
GENCO B 5 0.31 
GENCO C 6 0.002 
GENCO D 1 0.19 
GENCO E 10 0.104 
GENCO F 4 0.025 




Different Auctions to Be Simulated 
Parameter Lower Limit Upper Limit Step 
PP2 100 210 10 
PP1min 50 PP2 10 
PP1max PP1min PP2 10 
nr 30 130 20 
TD 0% ±20% ±5% 
Source: The authors 
 
 
i. Bid according to their CSC at round price 
ii. Bid according 25th percentile of their historical bids at 
round price 
iii. Bid according 75th percentile of their historical bids at 
round price 
The simulation was set with the following values: average 
spot price (87 $/kWh), spot price variance (1000 $/ ), 
PP2 was varied between 100 and 210 $/kWh and PP1 
between 50 and 210 $/kWh. All these values were chosen 
from the historical data about Colombia’s spot market. 
In order to vary the round size, an additional parameter was 
introduced: a maximum number of rounds (nr). Thus, round size 
is calculated by dividing the difference between the auction’s 
starting price and minimum price over nr. Thereby, the higher the 
maximum number of rounds, the smaller the size of the rounds. 
The simulation scenarios are composed of 5 variables: price 
PP2, maximum number of rounds (nr), total demand uncertainty 
(ΔTD) and the two PP1’s limits: PP1max and PP1min. 
Table III shows the parameters for the simulated auctions 
using the MATLAB algorithm described above. In all the 
auctions, more than 15.000 scenarios were simulated. 
 
4.  Results and Discussion 
 
The main model’s output is the auction’s clearing price 
(Pc). However, Pc is impacted by the demand curve shape, as 
is shown in Fig. 4. To avoid this possible bias in the analysis, 
a Modified Clearing Price (Pcm) was introduced to filter this 
effect and accordingly, to identify the direct parameters’ 
impact over bidders’ decision throughout the auction. 
Then the parameters’ impact over Pc and Pcm is evaluated 
by applying the Pearson’s coefficient to the simulation’s 
outputs. Table IV summarizes the results. 
From table IV, some conclusions can be inferred: 
i. PP2 has the greatest impact over Pc and Pcm. Thus, PP2 
price influences the clearing price, and also it directly 
influences bidders’ decision-making processes. 
ii. PP1 has an impact over Pc but not over Pcm. Thus, 
despite PP1 having an impact over the clearing price it 
doesn’t have an impact over bidders’ decisions. 
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Figure 4. Clearing Price (Pc) and Modified Clearing Price (Pcm).  
Source: The authors 
 
Table 4. 
Pearson’s Coefficient between Parameters and Pc or Pcm 
Parameter r with Pc r with Pcm 
PP2 0.89 0.95 
PP1min 0.54 0.29 
PP1max 0.74 0.51 
nr 0.09 0.03 
TD 0.03 0.03 
Source: The authors 
 
 
Figure 5. Clearing Price (Pc) against PP1 price.  
Source: The authors 
 
 
iii. The remaining parameters do not have a strong 
influence over the auction’s outputs. 
Fig. 5 shows a sensitivity analysis of auction outputs 
against PP1 with different PP2 values. This figure supports 
the conclusion about the greater impact that PP2 has over 
clearing prices and hence, over bidder’s decisions. As well, 
Fig. 5 is helpful to understand that PP1 impact is limited; PP1 
only impacts the auction output given that PP1 defines the 
demand curve shape and hence only Pc has a direct relation 
with PP1. Finally, an additional conclusion can be stated: 
PP1 doesn’t influence bidder’s decisions throughout the 
auction. Fig. 6 shows this fact. 
 
Figure 6. Modified Clearing Price (Pcm) against PP1 price.  
Source: The authors 
 
 
5.  Contributions and conclusions 
 
Two of the paper’s contributions must be highlighted. 
First, this paper proposes a methodology to obtain a 
GENCO’s contract supply curve from historical data about 
spot prices. Barroso [34] presented a similar methodology; 
however, the proposed methodology in this paper 
summarizes the GENCOs’ risk preference in one constant (γ) 
instead of a piecewise function. Roubik’s work [26] proposed 
a methodology to establish the hiring level based on the 
GENCOs’ risk preference; however, this paper contributes to 
Roubik’s work in the extend that it proposes a methodology 
to calculate the expected generation from spot market 
historical data and so, GENCO’s hiring profile is calculated 
from spot market information. This paper proposes a 
methodology to summarize spot market historical data in a 
statistic supply curve, which allows for statistic information 
about GENCO’s bidding profile to be obtained.  
The paper’s second important contribution is the 
modeling of GENCO’s strategic behavior throughout a 
dynamic auction. Models like Barroso’s obtain the GENCOs’ 
best response to the auction, but this response is independent 
of the auction’s development. Instead, this paper presents a 
methodology to get the GENCOs’ best response for the next 
round that allows the bidders’ adaptation along the auction to 
be understood. This modeling feature is extremely helpful to 
understand bidding behaviors for the purpose of future power 
market designs. 
Regarding the Colombian power market (MOR), some 
conclusions emerge from the application of the proposed 
model. This model allows the auction sensitivity of several 
demand curve parameters and round sizes to be evaluated. 
This sensitivity analysis allows the following conclusions to 
be stated: 
i. The auction’s starting price PP2 has the strongest 
impact on the auction’s clearing price. 
ii. Under MOR’s rules, PP1 price does not influence 
bidders’ decisions. However, PP1 has an important 
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effect on clearing prices because PP1 modifies the 
demand curve and consequently, the equilibrium price. 
iii. The round size strongly influences bidders’ decisions 
throughout the auction. Hence, suitable round size 
management is helpful to prevent anticompetitive 
behaviors among bidders. However, the round size 
impact over auction’s clearing price is low due to the 
strong relation between staring price and clearing price. 
These conclusions are extremely helpful to design market 
structures in power markets, given that it allows emerging 
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